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SOVEREIGNTY, SAFETY, AND SECURITY: TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 
UNDER THE STAFFORD AND HOMELAND SECURITY ACTS 
 





Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 
1988 (Stafford Act), which provides federal guidance and support for disaster relief 
efforts, American Indian tribal governments lack the ability to directly request a 
presidential declaration of a major disaster in Indian country.1 Tribes governing 
reservation land must instead formally request their state governors to ask the President 
for federal assistance. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Homeland Act), which 
supplies funds and program assistance to state and local governments in order to 
prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, creates an effect similar to the Stafford Act with 
respect to Indian tribes. Both the Stafford Act and the Homeland Act list tribes under 
their constituencies, but only under the definition of “local governments.”2 As such, both 
of these acts, one targeting general catastrophes and the other aimed at preventing and 
responding to human-made disasters, force tribal governments to place themselves at 
the mercy of their state executives. This not only creates administrative roadblocks in 
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1
 “Indian country” as referred to in this piece is a combination of both the accepted legal definition under 
18 U.S.C. § 1151, which includes Indian reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian 
allotments, and Indian lands not covered under this legal definition, particularly with regard to Alaska 
Native villages. See generally Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government et al., 522 U.S. 520 
(1998) (as a result of the holding in this case and the provisions of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act of 1971, many Alaska Native villages no longer qualify as “dependent Indian communities,” thereby 
preventing most land held by Alaska Natives in that state from being considered part of “Indian country” 
for purposes of jurisdiction). “American Indians” and “Natives” as referred to in this article are used 
interchangeably as all-inclusive terms for the sake of brevity, and should be considered to reference 
members of any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or indigenous community. 
2
 6 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A)–(B) (2003). 
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situations where timely response is essential, but also infringes upon tribal sovereignty 
and signifies a breach of the federal government’s duty to adequately provide for tribes.3 
 
In an attempt to address these concerns, the US House of Representatives is 
currently reviewing a bill proposing amendments to the Stafford Act. The amendments 
would provide tribes with the option of directly communicating emergency requests to 
the President and federal agencies, thereby addressing the needs of Native 
communities while reinforcing tribal sovereignty.4 Congress should therefore amend the 
Stafford Act as proposed, supporting the creation of a more robust emergency 
management system that treats Indian tribes equally compared to state and local 
governments.  
 
Congress should also change the Homeland Act to mirror the amended version 
of the Stafford Act. Unfortunately, the Homeland Act has received less attention during 
the legislative proposal to amend the Stafford Act. This could be due to several factors: 
first, the Homeland Act is relatively young and untested within Indian country. Second, 
environmental threats and disparities in environmental justice seem more prevalent in 
this time of climate change and increasingly extreme weather patterns. Third, media 
coverage on the issue of climate change has risen, and along with it, increased 
awareness of environmental justice issues. Compared to the emergence of 
environmental justice awareness, the threat of foreign and domestic terrorism to tribes 
seems miniscule. Still, tribes and their allies should advocate for amending the 
Homeland Act now, in order to capitalize on the momentum of Congress’s current 
attention to redrafting the language problems within the Stafford Act. Most importantly, 
strengthening the position of Indian tribes within the paradigm of homeland security now 
could prove to be pragmatic in the long-term, rather than waiting until real, significant 
terror threats occur.  
 
Even if these changes are made, a potential caveat lies in the broad diversity 
between American Indian tribes. In some cases, smaller tribes with weaker resource 
bases may be reluctant to alter the current scheme, as states often bear the brunt of 
implementing and paying for disaster preparations and relief. Thus, it may be most 
prudent for Congress to amend the Stafford and Homeland Acts in a way that would 
provide dynamic flexibility between individual tribal governments. Specifically, these 
                                                        
3
 Rob Capriccioso, Tribal Sovereignty Disaster Legislation Introduced, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA 
NETWORK, May 25, 2011, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/05/tribal-sovereignty-disaster-
legislation-introduced/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012); see Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 
(Nov. 6, 2000) (acknowledging the unique legal relationship between the federal government and tribes 
as “domestic dependent nations,” where the federal government not only recognizes and encourages 
maximum tribal sovereignty, but also owes a trust duty to Indian tribes).  
4
 Id. 
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amendments and subsequent programs would be stronger if crafted to echo the policies 
of current federal environmental legislation, such as the Clean Water Act (CWA), the 
Clean Air Act (CAA), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). These statutes allow 
tribes to determine internally if they want to apply for “Treatment in the Same Manner as 
a State” (TAS)5 status and formulate their own tribal environmental regulation entities, 
or if they wish to function entirely under the appropriate federal agency. In either case, 
states are precluded in these pieces of legislation and administrative procedures from 
participating in—or interfering with—tribal affairs. Thus, tribes would be afforded wide 
latitude in determining how to exercise their inherent sovereignty. 
 
This article analyzes the current effects of the Stafford and Homeland Acts’ 
provisions with regard to Indian country, including difficulties faced by tribes and social 
justice implications for indigenous groups. The examination of applicable federal Indian 
law and policy will follow, along with a discussion of the importance of tribal sovereignty 
and the ways in which the current legislation violates these principles. Finally, this article 
will conclude with a review of the 2011 proposed amendments to the Stafford Act, as 
well as an outline of recommendations for Congress and tribal advocates to borrow 
tenets from environmental regulation and weave these into disaster prevention and 
recovery laws. 
 
II. TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE STAFFORD AND HOMELAND ACTS 
 
Under the Stafford and Homeland Acts, states are the primary beneficiaries. The 
acts authorize the President to grant funds to states for disaster preparation and relief, 
rather than funding efforts to “local governments.”6 The Stafford Act defines “local 
government” as including “an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization, or Alaska 
Native village or organization.”7 The Homeland Act also lists “an Indian tribe or 
authorized tribal organization, or in Alaska a Native village or Alaska Regional Native 
Corporation” under its definition of “local government.”8 Thus, tribal lands are 
subordinate to states within the structure of these statutes. 
 
This is particularly harmful to tribes in light of the complex nature of Indian land 
holdings. Indeed, jurisdiction and property ownership in Indian country are often 
described in legal scholarship as intricate “patchwork” or as creating a “checkerboard.” 
                                                        
5
 Treatment in the Same Manner as a State, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (June 25, 2012), 
http://www.epa.gov/2012/06/tp/laws/tas.htm/American-Indian-Office-Tribal-Portal (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012). 
6
 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 5121–5207 and 6 U.S.C. § 101–613 (2003). 
7
 42 U.S.C. § 5122(7)(B). 
8
 6 U.S.C. § 101(11)(B) (2003). 
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Some land may be held in fee by tribal member individuals, or by the tribal government. 
Or, some parcels may be held in trust by the federal government for tribal or individual 
tribal member use. Numerous pieces of reservation land are leased to nontribal entities 
by the tribes or the federal government. To complicate the situation further, many land 
tracts in Indian country have multiple tribal member owners who hold restricted trust 
land in undivided shares—a product of decades of estate and probate practices that 
have continually fractionated Indian property allotments with each generation.9 Some of 
these allotments never passed to Indian descendants, as non-Indians settled on 
reservation lands that were “opened” by the federal government. This “checkerboard 
pattern . . . renders management and regulation of those lands and the peoples on them 
cumbersome at best.”10 Thus, in disaster law, adding the state as another player in this 
scheme complicates the framework from every angle, from pre-disaster planning and 
preparation to emergency response and recovery. 
 
The Stafford Act provides program funds for “Pre-disaster Hazard Mitigation” that 
are awarded as a result of recommendations to the President from state governors.11 
Each year by an October 1 deadline, state governors are required to identify and 
recommend at least five local governments (including tribal governments) to receive this 
type of funding.12 But state executives often have limited contact with tribes and tribal 
governments. While statistics are not available to show how many tribes as “local 
governments” are nominated by their respective state governors for federal pre-disaster 
hazard mitigation help, it seems likely that tribes are underrepresented within this 
scheme because the qualifications for such funding include proving cost-effectiveness 
and need, which can be difficult to show when compared to more populous or urban 
regions within a state. Thus, tribes face difficult barriers in garnering federal assistance 
through their states’ recommendations.13 
 
 Nevertheless, for certain types of funding, states may be forced into lending 
assistance to tribal governments. The Stafford Act requires that in order to be eligible for 
“an increased Federal share for hazard mitigation measures . . . a State, local, or tribal 
government shall develop . . . a mitigation plan that outlines processes for identifying 
natural hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities of the area under the jurisdiction of the 
government.”14 This section specifically names tribes as if they are separate and distinct 
from local governments, requiring that “[e]ach mitigation plan developed by a local or 
                                                        
9
 See generally Douglas R. Nash & Cecelia E. Burke, The Changing Landscape of Indian Estate Planning 
and Probate: The American Indian Probate Reform Act, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 121 (2006).  
10
 Id. at 127. 
11




 See infra Part V. 
14
 42 U.S.C. § 5165(a). 
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tribal government shall (1) describe actions to mitigate hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities 
identified under the plan; and (2) establish a strategy to implement those actions.”15 
States have a similar requirement to identify risks and vulnerabilities, but also to 
“support development of local mitigation plans” and “provide for technical assistance to 
local and tribal governments for mitigation planning.”16 For Native communities, the 
explicit reference to tribal governments is a definite improvement over a strict definition 
of tribes as “local governments.” But while the Act expressly forces states to offer 
technical support for tribal programs, this system ultimately contravenes federal Indian 
policy and the spirit of tribal sovereignty. 
 
The requirement of state governments to support mitigation planning efforts by 
tribal governments may be helpful to tribes, but presents an anomaly within the 
framework of federal Indian law. The separation of tribal and local governments under 
this section of the Stafford Act underscores the inclusion of tribes in the competition for 
state program assistance and federal funds along with cities, towns, and counties. Thus, 
tribes should have state support equal to that of other local governments when creating 
hazard mitigation plans. However, this still places tribal governments at the mercy of 
their state executives, a concept that violates basic federal Indian law principles.17 
 
Similarly to pre-disaster hazard mitigation funding procedures, when disasters do 
occur, tribes must again seek assistance from the President through their state 
executive. But while the Stafford Act clearly states, “[a]ll requests for a declaration by 
the President that an emergency exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected 
State,” an exception may exist.18 Indeed, the President may act and declare a disaster 
without gubernatorial request “when he determines that an emergency exists for which 
the primary responsibility for response rests with the United States because the 
emergency involves a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, the Unites States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and 
authority.”19 While tribes are not specifically mentioned in this section, the relationship 
between the federal government and Indian tribes should fall under this category. Thus, 
it is possible that the President has the ability to declare a major disaster in Indian 
country notwithstanding a request from a state governor. This possibility has never been 
exercised before 2010, begging the question of whether tribes are aware that they may 
                                                        
15
 Id. at § 5165(b). 
16
 Id. at § 5165(c). 
17
 Federal Indian law prescribes a duty of the federal government to care for and act as fiduciary to tribes 
on multiple levels. This relationship is discussed infra Part V. 
18
 42 U.S.C. § 5191(a). 
19
 Id. at § 5191(b). 
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appeal to the federal government for disaster relief under this procedural exception.20 
Further, since this exception has been rarely and only recently exercised, it is unknown 
when and how tribes would qualify for this direct assistance. 
 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL AND DISASTER JUSTICE: VULNERABILITIES IN NATIVE COMMUNITIES 
 
Native communities are one of the most disadvantaged groups in the United 
States. Widespread poverty and lack of services are common throughout Indian 
country, leading to vulnerability on many levels.21 For example, tribes and their 
indigenous traditions may be particularly vulnerable to damage caused by 
environmental change, as “[t]ribal cultural practices and religious beliefs are rooted in 
the Earth and woven into the web of life. Tribal members use wildlife and plants and 
other natural resources in ways that are different from other ethnic groups that exist 
within the American society.”22 This dependence and closeness with the environment is 
true even today; while some tribes in urban areas or with wealth sources (e.g., minerals, 
gaming) have been able to modernize their lands and lifestyles, “traditional cultural and 
religious beliefs and practices are still important components of the identities of 
contemporary Indian people.”23 Indeed, when Native lands are threatened by disaster, 
tribal members may lose access to food sources and important cultural sites, and 
further suffer emotional trauma from the disaster itself.24 
 
Because a healthful environment is so central to the continuance of indigenous 
lifeways, environmental changes are often more likely to adversely affect tribes than 
other communities. Even gradual changes in climate, rather than unexpected and 
immediate disaster, can harm tribal groups. For instance, temperatures in the arctic 
                                                        
20
 The Havasupai Tribe, traditionally residing around the Grand Canyon in Arizona, received direct FEMA 
funding to assist with recovery from floods that devastated the area in October 2010. This marks the first 
time that a Native tribe has received funds directly from FEMA exclusively for tribal use. Lee Allison, 
Havasupai Tribe and FEMA sign disaster agreement today, ARIZ. GEOLOGY: BLOG OF THE STATE 
GEOLOGIST OF ARIZ. (Jan. 27, 2011, 8:13 a.m.), http://arizonageology.blogspot.com/2011/01/havasu-tribe-
and-fema-sign-disaster.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
21
 See Duane Champagne, Living or Surviving on Native American Reservations, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY 
MEDIA NETWORK, Oct. 8, 2011, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/10/living-or-surviving-on-
native-american-reservations/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
22
 Dean B. Suagee, Dimensions of Environmental Justice in Indian Country and Native Alaska (Second 
National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit Resource Paper Series, 2002), in CLIFFORD 





 The Ute Indian Tribe suffered from major flooding and landslides in June 2011, and reported that 
“[c]ultural sites are . . . expected to be damaged by flood waters and road closures will prevent access to 
traditional hunting, gathering and ceremonial sites.” Ranae Bangerter & Geoff Liesik, Tribe declares 
flooding emergency, VERNAL EXPRESS, June 8, 2011, http://www.vernal.com/stories/Tribe-declares-
flooding-emergency-,1548086 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
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have increased more than in most areas of the globe, melting sea ice and glaciers, 
thawing permafrost, and altering forest and tundra ecosystems. Aside from issues 
affecting wildlife, which arctic peoples depend upon for subsistence, the physical 
makeup of the changing arctic and subarctic is directly endangering indigenous 
communities. In particular, the increasing arctic temperatures have caused the sea ice 
to form later in the year than usual, and when the ice does form, it is smaller in area and 
thinner than normal. The ice then attaches to the coast later in the season, breaks up 
earlier, and melts earlier.25 The melting sea ice prevents the buildup of natural 
protection of the shoreline from harsh storm surges.26 
 
This devastating change has created insurmountable challenges for Native 
villages in the arctic and subarctic regions. For example, the absence of the sea ice 
buffer has allowed an onslaught of waves against the western coast of Alaska, causing 
massive erosion and flooding. In one year, over one hundred fifty feet of beach at the 
Native village of Kivalina disappeared into the sea, forcing villagers to line their 
encroaching shores, in vain, with sandbags.27 Likewise, the village of Shishmaref, 
located on an island above the Bering Strait, lost thirty feet of land in the span of two 
hours during a storm. Shishmaref lies only a few feet above sea level, and now deals 
with overnight erosion and flooding.28  
 
As another example, the village of Newtok, Alaska, directly west of Bethel, has 
similar problems with flooding and erosion. Newtok was constructed atop permafrost, 
which has melted and shifted with the changes in northern climate.29 Buildings have 
sunk into the ground, their foundations crumbling and mixing with leaking sewage.30 
Shishmaref, Newtok, Kivalina, and others desperately seeking to move their 
communities to safer, higher ground have appealed to Congress to help them relocate 
                                                        
25
 Complaint at 4, lines 26–27, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil et al., 663, F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 30, 2009). 
26
 Id. The climate change situation in Alaska is also different from “the Lower 48” in terms of the 
relationships between governmental entities and tribes, because the legal status of Alaska Natives is 
unique. Only one reservation exists in Alaska, despite the state’s massive size. The remaining Native 
tribes and villages were divided into twelve regional areas and incorporated into Native-owned 
corporations. Thus, “tribal members” in the Lower 48 are akin to Alaska’s “Native shareholders.” 
Furthermore, Alaska Natives—through village and regional corporations—hold most of their lands in fee 
simple, rather than occupying lands held in trust for Native use by the federal government as in the Lower 
48. See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §1601–1633. 
27
 Elizabeth Arnold, Tale of Two Alaskan Villages, NPR, July 29, 2008, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93029431 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
28
 Moving Alaskan Villages Away from Encroaching Sea, NPR, Nov. 25, 2005, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5027517 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
29
 Anna York, Alaskan village stands on leading edge of climate change, POWERING A NATION, 2012, 
http://unc.news21.com/index.php/stories/alaska.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
30
 Id. 
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inland. Congress has failed to aid the villages, however. In 2008, the Senate did not 
pass legislation that would have allowed appropriation of funds to relocate Alaska 
coastal villages. Since then, the situation has become more dire with each season, 
compelling Alaska Natives to seek federal assistance through the Stafford Act and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), rather than new legislation directly 
addressing the concerns of the villages.31 
 
 FEMA, which is tasked with coordinating the federal government’s 
responsibilities under the Stafford Act, has several disaster mitigation and recovery 
programs that could be applicable to the climate changes threatening Alaska Native 
villages.32 In order to qualify for most FEMA disaster mitigation grants, communities 
must submit mitigation plans for FEMA’s approval.33 Most Alaska Native villages have 
not done so; but for those that have, the villages face the problem of meeting FEMA’s 
cost-effectiveness standards. Indeed, “[w]ith low populations and high construction 
costs in rural Alaska [because of the difficult terrain and high cost of transportation] 
village relocation projects have low benefit-to-cost ratios.”34 However, Alaska state 
officials have begun to assist Native villages with creating mitigation plans, specifically 
with the goal of obtaining grant funding from FEMA.35 While this will undoubtedly aid 
threatened Alaska Native groups in qualifying for disaster mitigation programs, the cost-
benefit analysis required by FEMA remains a significant hurdle because of the relatively 
low populations and high cost of transporting and working in rural Alaska. Moreover, 
FEMA generally provides grants on a statewide basis, rather than in local areas.36 
Given the size of Alaska and the isolation of some Native villages, federal aid under this 
framework is unlikely. 
 
                                                        
31
 Arnold, supra note 27. In 2012, Congress enacted the Quileute Indian Tribe Tsunami and Flood 
Protection Act to assist the Quileute Tribe (located on the Olympic Peninsula in western Washington) with 
moving several tribal buildings to higher ground. The act has given the tribe 785 acres of trust land carved 
out of Olympic National Park, which will allow the Quileute to move the tribal school, elder center, and 
other buildings out of the immediate tsunami zone and floodplain. Pub. L. No. 112-97, 126 Stat. 257 
(2012). The legislation is likely a result of concerns for the vulnerable coastal lowlands following the 2011 
earthquake and tsunami in Japan. See Richard Walker, Quileute Is Moving to Higher Ground, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK, Feb. 28, 2012, 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/02/28/quileute-is-moving-to-higher-ground-100321 (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
32
 A 2009 federal government report lists thirty-one “imminently threatened” Alaska Native villages along 
the Alaska coastline and river systems. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
REQUESTERS GAO-09-551, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: LIMITED PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING 
VILLAGES THREATENED BY FLOODING AND EROSION 12 (June 2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09551.pdf (last visited on Nov. 16, 2012). 
33
 See 42 U.S.C. § 5133(c). 
34
 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 22–23. 
35
 Id. at 34. 
36
 Id. at 23, n.19. 
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In addition, FEMA mitigation and recovery programs under the Stafford Act are 
only applicable in areas that have been declared federal disasters. This poses a 
problem for Alaska Native groups because “many of the villages are facing gradual 
erosion problems and have not received a declared disaster designation, [so] they do 
not qualify for these programs.”37 Since the Stafford Act requires the governor of an 
endangered state to request that the President declare a major disaster before FEMA 
funding can be triggered, Alaska Native villages are thus dependent upon the governor 
of Alaska to request federal assistance. Considering the remote isolation of many 
villages and the fact that some are not incorporated as official towns, many villages are 
unable to request either funding from the state or convince the governor that federal 
funds are necessary. Where villages are able to gather state and/or federal assistance 
in creating disaster mitigation plans, most are only able to mitigate their losses by 
relocating to a safer area, which requires long-term planning and support. In most 
cases, long-term state and federal aid for villages have proved grossly insufficient.38 
 
Of course, Alaska Native villages are not the only indigenous communities 
threatened by climate change and other disasters. In the summer of 2011 alone, 
numerous Indian reservations on the Great Plains faced serious flooding issues. The 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation in northeast Utah depleted its own financial sources from 
the Ute Tribe Emergency Management Department, as well as funds it had been given 
from the state, in order to purchase sandbags for flooding.39 The Blackfeet Indian 
Reservation in northwestern Montana suffered from flooding problems for several 
months after an unusually harsh winter caused rivers and culverts to overflow from 
melting snow on the Rocky Mountains.40 In eastern Montana, the Crow Indian 
Reservation saw flooding from record rainfall, damaging hundreds of homes and 
revealing that many of the homes should have been condemned long before the 
                                                        
37
 Id. at 23. 
38
 “After [the village of Allakaket] was flooded in 1994 and almost completely destroyed . . . homes were 
moved out of the floodplain . . . but many homes and infrastructure components were rebuilt or replaced 
in or near the floodplain. In August 1995, FEMA and the Alaska Division of Emergency Services provided 
a comprehensive plan to the people of Allakaket to use as guidance for completing the relocation process 
over a 20-year period. Subsequently, without a lead federal or state entity for providing relocation 
assistance and lacking the internal capacity and resources to sustain the relocation process, Allakaket 
has made minimal progress over the last 14 years.” Id. at 41. 
39
 It is likely that the Ute Tribe is able to support its own Emergency Management Department because 
the reservation is the second largest in the United States, and generates revenue through its oil and gas 
drilling, as well as its water company that serves the three counties. Bangerter & Liesik, supra note 24. 
40
 I observed this firsthand during the summer of 2011 while I lived and worked on the Blackfeet 
Reservation. Several of my clients and friends were forced to live with their family members in already 
grossly inadequate housing units and used FEMA trailers because the tribal government was unable to 
secure emergency housing. 
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floodwaters destroyed them.41 Many of these tribal members faced the prospect of 
completely rebuilding or relocating rather than repairing their homes, causing 
considerable hardship for some families. Additionally, the flooding in Montana was 
statewide, triggering the governor to request and receive a presidential disaster 
declaration.42 This secured some federal funding for tribes, but home ownership in 
Indian country is often complex and not easily discernable.43 This presents an issue on 
reservation lands because “[h]omes that are [tribally owned] are eligible for the FEMA 
repair funds, but residents who own their homes are responsible for their own recovery 
and repairs. For those homeowners, flood insurance would be key—but many don’t 
have it.”44 Therefore, FEMA funding through gubernatorial request is ineffective in these 
situations because no stopgap exists to cover uninsured or underinsured tribal 
homeowners on federal trust land. 
 
These examples of current disaster-related problems on tribal lands represent 
the power disparity between tribal governments and states in obtaining assistance for 
mitigation and recovery programs. Not only do American Indian and Alaska Native 
communities face disaster on the same level as other communities, but their access to 
funds and services from the federal government is hindered by the complex nature of 
land ownership and jurisdiction in Indian country. As well, issues arise due to general 
vulnerabilities in tribal infrastructure and lack of socioeconomic strength, coupled with 
the stringent requirements for requesting federal disaster aid. These barriers signify a 
gross discrepancy between disaster law and federal Indian law, and also indicate an 
alarming failure on the part of the federal government to support tribal sovereignty. 
 
IV. HOMELAND SECURITY: LACK OF PROTECTION FOR FIRST AMERICANS 
 
Similar to the deficiencies in natural disaster law and procedure, the Homeland 
Act falls short of addressing tribal-specific concerns. Border patrol in particular can be a 
challenge to tribal governments, with 260 of the 7,400 miles of US international 
boundaries lying on tribal lands.45 Critics have pointed to the potential for illegal border 
                                                        
41
 Crow Reservation in Montana on the Long Road to Recovery, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK, 
June 29, 2011, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/06/crow-reservation-in-montana-on-the-




 Many of my Blackfeet clients did not know if they owned their land parcels or the structures on them, or 
if the tribe or the federal government owned them and “leased” them (usually for free) or held them in 
trust for the use of tribal members. 
44
 Crow Reservation, supra note 41. 
45
 Jennifer Butts, Victims in Waiting: How the Homeland Security Act Falls Short of Fully Protecting Tribal 
Lands, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 373, 383 (2004). 
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crossings onto tribal lands where tribal law enforcement is severely limited.46 Tribes that 
do not abut international borders are also at risk, as their lands could be targeted by 
domestic terrorists or other terror entities that have already successfully infiltrated US 
borders.  
 
Potential terrorism targets are easily found within reservation boundaries, such 
as underground high-pressure interstate gas lines, manufacturing facilities catering to 
the US Department of Defense, important freight train routes, nuclear power plants and 
waste storage sites, hydroelectric dams, and even missile launch facilities.47 In all of 
these places, as soon as tribes exhaust their own resources for addressing terrorist 
threats, state governments will likely control funding for preventing and immediately 
responding to a terrorist attack. Indeed, the Homeland Act “ignores congressional 
plenary power over the tribes, . . . [as states] are responsible for distributing the funding 
from the Department of Homeland Security. . . . Just as a county, city, or town would be 
subject to state control and supervision, so would a tribe.”48 Subjecting tribes to state 
control and supervision thus presents a flagrant violation of the tenets of federal Indian 
law and tribal rights to self-governance, and ultimately leaves tribes vulnerable to 
terrorist attack without adequate protections.  
 
V. BALANCING INTERESTS: GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Modern federal Indian law rests upon three cases from the early 1800s, often 
referred to as the “Marshall trilogy.” In Johnson v. M'Intosh,49 Cherokee Nation v. State 
of Georgia,50 and Worcester v. State of Georgia,51 Chief Justice John Marshall laid 
foundational principles for the relationship between the federal government and Indian 
tribes.52 In Cherokee Nation, Marshall wrote that Indian tribes were neither state 
entities, nor foreign powers. Instead, they were “domestic dependent nations,” where 
the relationship between a tribe and the federal government is equal to that of “a ward 
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 For instance, the Blackfeet Reservation consists of 1.5 million acres of land, including approximately 
sixty miles along the Canadian border. The Reservation is internally patrolled by four to five on-duty tribal 
police officers at any given time. Interview with Nathan St. Goddard, Tribal Attorney, Blackfeet Nation 
(Oct. 11, 2012). 
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 Butts, supra note 45, at 385–86.  
48
 Id. at 389. 
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 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
50
 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
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 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
52
 This article does not focus in detail on these three foundational cases, nor on the following 180 years of 
Indian law jurisprudence. My summation of these principles is an oversimplification of the vast 
complexities of federal Indian law. For more in-depth discussion, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron 
Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627 (2006). 
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to his guardian.”53 This relationship, or “trust doctrine,” has been interpreted as a 
fiduciary duty on the part of the federal government, with Congress ultimately 
responsible for the trusteeship on behalf of Indian tribes. As such, in exchange for lands 
and resources ceded by tribes to the federal government, the United States is 
responsible for protecting and preserving the borders of Indian country.54 A large part of 
this includes keeping tribes safe from state encroachment by preventing states from 
interfering with tribal affairs.55 But through a century and a half of harmful Indian 
policies, “that relationship with the United States became tainted, and corrupted by the 
betrayal of Andrew Jackson's Executive Branch and by Congress, just as the 
relationship between all the other Indian tribes and the United States became tainted 
and corrupted by betrayal.”56 Thus, the original holdings from the Marshall Court have 
been twisted, confused, and eroded into modern common law that makes defining 
today’s theoretical and de facto trust relationship nearly impossible. 
 
Additionally, as a result of the civil rights movement in the 1960s, the federal 
government initiated a general policy towards Indian self-determination, empowering 
Congress to enact several laws aimed at strengthening tribal autonomy.57 Both the trust 
doctrine and the self-determination policy highlight that there is a strong—albeit often 
dysfunctional58—relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government. This 
relationship, with a few exceptions left over from darker periods of federal Indian law,59 
precludes states from intruding upon tribal communities. The Stafford and Homeland 
Acts clearly sidestep these principles by forcing tribes to route their disaster needs 
through their respective state executives. As such, not only do these laws fail in keeping 
consistent with federal Indian policy, but they also impede tribal abilities to exercise 
sovereignty. 
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 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831). 
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 Fletcher, supra note 52, at 661. 
57
 See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450f–450n; Indian Education Assistance Act, 25 
U.S.C. §§ 455–458e. 
58
 For instance, the federal government as trustee is responsible for representing tribes in certain legal 
actions, even when an agency of the federal government is on the other side of such a lawsuit. See, Ann 
C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice’s Conflict of Interest in Representing Native 
American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307 (2003) (“The Department of Justice takes a very Darth Vader-like 
position in its representation of Native American tribes. . . . When the Department of Justice seeks to 
resolve a conflict between a tribe and an agency, the conflict is not between two Executive agencies; 
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 For example, Public Law 83-280 (PL-280), which was enacted in 1953, transferred jurisdiction in Indian 
country from the federal government to some states. PL-280 did not require consent of Indian tribes, and 
tribes were not consulted. 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360. 
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In an effort to clarify federal Indian policy, President Clinton issued Executive 
Order (EO) 13,175 in late 2000 entitled, “Consultation and Coordination with Indian 
Tribal Governments.”60 In his order, the President outlined three fundamental principles 
to guide governmental agencies in formulating policies that impact Indian country. First, 
the order delineates the Marshall trilogy concepts of federal Indian law—that the US 
government holds a special and unique legal relationship with tribes, where tribes are 
“domestic dependent nations” under the protection of the United States as trustee.61 
Second, the President recognized that “[a]s domestic dependent nations, Indian tribes 
exercise inherent sovereign powers over their members and territory,” and that the 
working relationship between tribes and the federal government is on a “government-to-
government basis.”62 Third, the EO states unequivocally that “[t]he United States 
recognizes the right of Indian tribes to self-government and supports tribal sovereignty 
and self-determination.”63 Again, the Stafford and Homeland Acts are crafted in such a 
way to prevent this government-to-government communication between the United 
States and tribes. Thus, these disaster laws do not conform to this important 
presidential reiteration of the federal duty to protect and support tribal sovereignty. 
 
Federal agencies following the three guidelines set forth in EO 13,175 are thus 
instructed to respect tribal self-governance, and to create and implement policies 
according to the trust relationship. In general, agencies must “grant Indian tribal 
governments the maximum administrative discretion possible,” as well as defer to tribes 
wherever possible when establishing agency standards and goals.64 Despite the strong 
language commanding maximum participation and deference to Indian tribal 
governments, federal governmental agencies may struggle with ambiguities strewn 
throughout the EO. For instance, defining the boundaries of where it is “possible” to 
allow for maximum tribal discretion could cause glitches where agencies are forced to 
balance the goals of preserving tribal sovereignty with resource allocation and 
expertise. Particularly where agencies are not equipped with culturally competent 
agency-tribal liaisons, following the EO could require overcoming significant 
communication obstacles between agencies and tribes.  
 
One way to defeat this obstacle is to prescribe specific programmatic functions 
within agencies, where an employee trained in tribal relations is designated for the 
position of ensuring support for tribal objectives, while also advocating internally for 
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 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1 
(1831) (jurisdictional holding, wherein Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that the relationship between 
Indian tribes and the federal government is that of a “ward to its guardian”). 
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 Exec. Order No. 13,175 § 2(a), 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000). 
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 Id. at § 2(b). 
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 Id. at § 2(c). 
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agencies to meaningfully consider and consult with tribes when promulgating policies 
and regulations.65 Furthermore, this could aid in increasing general agency knowledge 
and effectiveness, especially in the field of environmental regulation and response to 
natural disasters where tribes are more acquainted with their local ecosystems than 
outsiders.66  
 
 In addressing the shortcomings of self-determination policies, federal agencies 
have begun taking steps to work cooperatively with tribal governments. In late 2009, 
President Obama attempted to address ambiguities in EO 13,175 by issuing a 
memorandum instructing agencies to complete “a detailed plan of actions [each] agency 
will take to implement the policies and directives of Executive Order 13,175” within 
ninety days.67 The President explained that his administration is “committed to regular 
and meaningful consultation and collaboration with tribal officials in policy decisions that 
have tribal implications.”68 Agencies were further directed to consult with tribal officials 
in creating their plans, and to continually report on their progress to the President.69 
 
Following President Obama’s memorandum, FEMA in 2010 released a document 
outlining its tribal policy. According to FEMA, in doing so it had “engaged all Federally-
recognized [sic] Tribes to gather suggested revisions to FEMA’s existing Tribal Policy,” 
integrating feedback and ideas from these meetings in order to “enhance FEMA’s 
relationship with the Nation’s American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal communities to 
support preparing for, recovering from, mitigating, and responding to all natural and 
manmade hazards and disasters.”70 Importantly, FEMA’s resulting policy states:  
FEMA acknowledges the inherent sovereignty of American Indian and Alaska Native 
Tribal governments, the trust responsibility of the federal government, and the nation-to-
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 FEMA’s 2010 tribal policy statement promises that the agency will “[c]onsider the designation of full-
time tribal liaisons in appropriate FEMA regional offices and explore the possibility of assigning attorneys 
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FEMA, FEMA TRIBAL POLICY 4 (June 29, 2010), available at 
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nation relationship between the US Government and American Indian and Alaska Native 
Tribal governments as established by specific statutes, treaties, court decisions, 
executive orders, regulations, and policies. FEMA further acknowledges the precedents 
of the Constitution, the President of the United States, and the US Congress as the 
foundation of this policy’s content.71  
 
However, FEMA’s policy also states that while it will follow the spirit of the 
policy’s content—presumably stemming from EO 13,175 and the 2009 Presidential 
Memorandum—the policy will have to operate within the confines of existing law and will 
remain consistent with current authority.72 But current authority points to the Stafford 
and Homeland Acts, which lump tribes within the definition of “local governments.” 
Therefore, without amending these two pieces of legislation, FEMA’s Tribal Policy 
contradicts the procedural requirements of federal disaster law and ultimately has little 
real effect upon practices of engaging tribes on a government-to-government basis. 
While new policy from the executive branch requires “regular and meaningful 
consultation and collaboration with tribal officials,”73 doing so could effectively mean 
operating outside the construction of the Stafford and Homeland Acts. 
 
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION: ATTEMPTS TO ELEVATE TRIBAL STATUS 
 
Congressman Nick J. Rahall from Wyoming introduced a bill in the House of 
Representatives on May 24, 2011, proposing significant amendments to the Stafford Act 
with regard to American Indian tribes.74 In addition to minor changes to the language of 
the original Stafford Act, HR 1953 states under “Indian Tribal Government Requests” 
that “[t]he Chief Executive of an affected Indian tribal government may submit a request 
for declaration by the President that a major disaster exists.”75 This simple provision is 
key in addressing the barriers for tribal government in directly requesting and receiving 
federal assistance. Additionally, the use of the word “may” in this amendment would 
presumably allow tribes the option to continue routing requests through state 
executives. This supports both tribal sovereignty—allowing tribes to autonomously 
make decisions about whether to approach the federal government directly or to 
continue within the Stafford Act’s historical scheme—and also indicates congressional 
understanding of the wide variances between tribes and their respective resources and 
interests. 
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Next, HR 1953 would amend the Stafford Act to designate tribes as separate 
government entities. The bill specifies that when a tribal chief executive requests a 
declaration of disaster from the President in order to qualify for federal assistance, 
“references to ‘State’ and ‘Governor’ in . . . this Act shall mean ‘Indian tribal government’ 
and the ‘Chief Executive’ of an affected Indian tribal government, respectively.”76 The 
same language is repeated for emergency declarations in addition to major disaster 
declarations. Furthermore, “Indian tribal government is defined” as “the governing body 
of any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that the 
secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe under the Federally 
Recognized Indian Tribe List,” and that “[t]he term ‘Chief Executive’ means the person 
who is recognized by the Secretary of the Interior as the chief elected administrative 
officer of an Indian tribal government.”77 The proposed amendment clearly attempts to 
be as inclusive with tribes as possible. Importantly, it also allows tribes the choice to opt 
out, thereby supporting sovereignty principles in multiple ways. It potentially strengthens 
the tribal-federal relationship as well by providing tribal governments with an avenue for 
directly communicating their needs with the federal government—an ability that should 
be protected on all levels of federal procedure in order to comply with foundations of 
Indian law, EO 13,175, and President Obama’s 2009 Memorandum. 
 
While the proposed amendment to the Stafford Act is a vital step for protecting 
tribal self-government and strengthening the tribal-federal relationship, this change may 
fall short of addressing increasing needs in Indian country. For instance, coastal villages 
in Alaska facing climate change emergencies still would not qualify under FEMA cost-
benefit requirements and continue to face an uphill battle securing funds through the 
traditional meaning of a “disaster.” Furthermore, the proposed amendment does not 
necessarily provide additional scaffolding to support tribes in creating functional and 
professional emergency management departments, so significant economic barriers 
remain for smaller and poorer tribes. 
 
In 2009, Congressman Frank Pallone, Jr. of New Jersey introduced HR 1697, 
which is intended to “ensure the coordination and integration of Indian tribes in the 
National Homeland Security strategy and to establish an Office of Tribal Government 
Homeland Security within the Department of Homeland Security.”78 The bill appears to 
have died before reaching the Senate, but acknowledged in its findings that “[d]espite 
the government-to-government relationship between Indian tribes and the United 
States, the Unites States has failed to include and consult with Indian tribes with regard 
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to homeland security prevention, protection, and response activities planning.”79 The bill 
would have provided for full participation of tribal governments within national security 
strategies, as well as given tribes shares of funding to prevent and respond to terror 
threats. The proposal outlined several goals for enhancing coordination of Indian tribes 
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including meeting the federal 
government’s trust responsibility to American Indians.80 If Congress had enacted this 
piece of legislation, it would have elevated tribes to equal status as states and local 
governments in dealing with terrorist threats. The failure to create a tribal government 
department within DHS thus leaves tribes on the periphery of national security policies, 
and limits the government-to-government relationship between tribes and the federal 
government.  
 
The death of HR 1697 is particularly disappointing considering the potential 
shortcomings of HR 1953. The former would have made an extraordinary leap for 
American Indian rights and sovereignty, providing tribes and DHS with a comprehensive 
system that would have compelled the federal government to cooperate as equals with 
tribal entities and to fund them accordingly. In contrast, HR 1953 would signify a step in 
a healthy direction for tribal sovereignty, adding tribal governments in the Stafford Act 
as separate from local and state governments. But HR 1953 does not acknowledge 
basic and unique challenges in Indian country that must be addressed in order to make 
disaster preparation, mitigation, and response systems fully effective. 
 
VII. TREATING TRIBES IN THE SAME MANNER AS STATES IN DISASTER LAW 
 
Treating tribal governments in the same way as states would address many of 
these issues in both the Stafford and Homeland Acts. In fact, current regulations in 
environmental law provide a glimpse of how this proposed framework could successfully 
function. Under the CAA, CWA, and SDWA, tribes may be granted treatment as state 
(TAS) status in order to allow tribal governments to exercise regulatory and civil 
jurisdiction over tribal lands. The purpose of bestowing tribal TAS status is “to recognize 
and promote the right of tribal governments to protect the health and welfare of their 
members,” thereby reinforcing tribal sovereignty and strengthening the tribal-federal 




 The bill also purported to provide funds for the Indian Health Service and the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 
order to “respond to the homeland security needs of American Indians and Alaska Natives, without 
jeopardizing the non-security missions of the Indian Health Service and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.” Id. 
Particularly with respect to IHS, budget constraints and underfunding are a chronic issue in Indian 
country. If a human-made disaster were to occur within Indian country, IHS would likely be grossly 
incapable of an appropriate emergency medical response. 
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relationship by preventing outside encroachment upon tribal regulatory rights.81 Even if 
the Stafford Act is amended through HR 1953 and Congress follows suit with a parallel 
amendment to the Homeland Act, these provisions may be more beneficial to tribes if 
additional procedures are inserted to echo those within the CAA, CWA, and SDWA. 
 
In order to qualify for TAS status under these environmental statutes, tribes must 
achieve the approval of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), through the 
following conditions: 
1. The tribe must be federally recognized and must be “exercising governmental 
authority over a Federal Indian reservation.” 
2. The tribe must have “a governing body carrying out substantial governmental 
duties and powers.” 
3. The functions exercised by the Indian tribe must pertain “to the management and 
protection of water resources which are . . . held by the Indian tribe . . . [or] held 
by the United States in trust for Indians . . . [or] held by a member of the Indian 
Tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust restriction or alienation, or 
otherwise within the borders of the Indian reservation.” 
4. The Indian tribe must be “reasonably” capable, in the “Administrator’s judgment, 
of carrying out the functions.”82 
Once these baseline requirements are met, qualifying tribes must submit a statement 
detailing the nature of the land and resources to be regulated by the tribe, as well as a 
description of the management capabilities of the tribal administration. This description 
should also contain a comprehensive plan for gaining the expertise and tools needed for 
effective regulation, including a strategy for gaining the necessary funds for resource 
management.83 
 
Tribal governments would be more likely to achieve a clearer understanding of 
best practices for disaster prevention, mitigation, and recovery programs with the 
implementation of these TAS status procedures. Tribes would be able to gain easier 
access to a higher level of support from federal agencies during the planning process, 
as this would elevate tribal status to a point where the EPA or FEMA would serve as 
supporting agencies, rather than as the primary administering agencies. Most 
importantly, TAS status under the Stafford and Homeland Acts would provide tribes the 
option to internally prioritize safety and security issues, thereby providing tribal 
                                                        
81
 Courtney A. Stouff, Native Americans and Homeland Security: Failure of the Homeland Security Act to 
Recognize Tribal Sovereignty, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 375, 385, 387 (2003). 
82
 Marren Sanders, Clean Water in Indian Country: The Risks (and Rewards) of Being Treated in the 
Same Manner as a State, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 533, 538 (2010) (outlining 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a)(1)–(4) 
and 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(l)). 
83
 Id. at 538–39. 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume I, Issue I – Fall 2012 
 
145 
governments discretion in exercising their inherent sovereignty in protecting their lands 
and people. 
 
However, TAS status also has its shortcomings. It mirrors paternalistic policies 
with strict application requirements, thereby forcing theoretically sovereign nations to 
apply for power they should already possess. In addition, some Indian reservations 
contain considerable populations of nontribal members who may resent being subject to 
tribal jurisdiction. For instance, in the 1990s the EPA granted TAS status under the 
CWA to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes in order to regulate pollutant 
discharges on the Flathead Indian Reservation in Montana.84 The Flathead Reservation 
holds within its boundaries several nontribal facilities owned in fee simple by state, 
county, and municipality entities, in addition to a high population of nonmembers.85 
Several nontribal groups challenged the EPA’s TAS designation, questioning the tribes’ 
jurisdictional ability to control and regulate activities of nontribal entities within the 
external boundaries of the reservation.86 While the court ultimately upheld the TAS 
grant, the tribes faced much resistance and tension as a result of the EPA’s delegation 
of authority.87 
 
Finally, the TAS status framework cannot alleviate the challenges faced by 
poorer and smaller tribes. Tribes without strong revenue sources would have difficulty 
demonstrating to the administering agency that they could fund their own regulations for 
disaster planning and response, especially if tribes want to lead planning efforts for 
national security risks in addition to environmental disasters. Each area of disaster law 
would require a different set of tools and expertise, thereby requiring more tribal time 
and money to put these systems in place. Additionally, tribes with smaller population 
and/or land bases would likely struggle to justify the use of limited resources for disaster 
regulation. As such, a faithful application of the TAS status regime would probably not 
function seamlessly in every tribal environmental or security management project. 
Instead, the optimum approach for tribes could be a framework that combines TAS 




The best option for tribes could be a hybrid of current and amended disaster laws 
combined with the TAS status system in environmental law. Identifying and then 
blending the best practices from both realms may be an ambitious task, as it would first 
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require selecting the provisions that are most beneficial to tribal entities. Even through 
careful selection and merging of these provisions, the resulting system would not 
necessarily address the funding issue, which is often an underlying roadblock for 
programs in Indian country. But it may still be worthwhile—the hybrid model could 
compel the EPA, FEMA, DHS, Customs and Border Protection, and Congress to meet 
tribal governments at an equal level to address the threats and interests of those in 
Indian country. It would also create a dynamic system, wherein tribes that do have the 
capability to implement their own disaster regulations would be able to do so with direct 
federal support. At the same time, tribes that do not have the resources or choose not to 
create their own programs could still rely on the federal government and retain their 
sovereignty instead of appealing to states for assistance. Finally, a hybrid model would 
also benefit the federal government by easing administrative burdens while satisfying 
federal aims of supporting tribal self-governance. 
 
Regardless of whether this hybrid strategy is employed in the future for tribes 
within the disaster law realm, the Stafford and Homeland Acts must be amended to 
remove tribal governments and lands from the legal definitions of “local government.” 
The current statutes have proven too dangerous for the well-being of tribal lands and 
peoples, as the laws force tribal governments to beg their state executives for 
assistance that may never be granted, or may be granted in grossly inadequate form. 
Thus, when disasters do strike in Indian country, tribal members often suffer needlessly 
due to this basic lack of services and access. Amending the Stafford and Homeland 
Acts would not only begin the process of addressing these dramatic shortcomings, but 
would also comply with federal law regarding the US government’s obligations to 
American Indian tribes and, perhaps most importantly, would give greater deference to 
inherent tribal rights for sovereignty and self-determination. Without serious, 
fundamental changes to these laws now, along with continual reassessment and 
restructuring in the future shaping of disaster law, American Indians remain subject to 
grave social injustices in times of great need. 
